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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-DISCOVERY-RIGHT OF PROSECUTION TO PRE-TRIAL 
DISCOVERY-In a trial for rape, the defendant indicated an intention to 
rely on his alleged impotency as a defense. The trial court thereupon 
granted the prosecution's motion for discovery of all medical reports and 
X-rays relating to the defendant's present physical condition, the names 
and addresses of all physicians who had treated the defendant prior to trial, 
and the names and addresses of all physicians who had been subpoenaed 
to testify for the defendant. On petition by the defendant, the intermediate 
appellate court issued a writ of prohibition restraining the enforcement 
of the trial court's order.1 On review, held, reversed, two judges dissenting 
1 Jones v. Superior Court, 197 Cal. App. 2d 836, 17 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1962). 
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in part.2 The prosecution is entitled to discover information pertinent to 
evidence which the defendant intends to introduce in the nature of an 
exculpatory defense; such information does not fall within the scope of 
the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination. Jones v. Superior Court, 
372 P.2d 919, 22 Cal. Rptr. 879 (1962). 
Criminal discovery3 was a practice foreign to the common law:' Its 
development in contemporary systems of criminal procedure has been re-
sisted on the grounds that it would compound the already disproportionate 
procedural advantages enjoyed by the defendant,5 facilitate subornation of 
perjury and fabrication of evidence, 6 and enable the prosecution to en-
croach upon the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination.7 None-
theless, a number of jurisdictions have overcome such objections and held 
that a trial court, in the exercise of its discretion, may compel the pre-trial 
disclosure of the prosecution's case upon proper motion by the defendant.8 
2 The Supreme Court of California vacated the opinion of the lower court, and then 
issued a peremptory writ of prohibition against the broad right of discovery granted by 
the trial court, while at the same time directing that court to allow the discovery of 
that evidence requested which the defendant actually intended to use at the trial. 
3 Traditionally, the term discovery has been held to comprehend oral and written 
depositions of parties and witnesses, interrogatories to adverse parties, notices for inspection 
and copying, physical and mental examinations, and demands for admissions. However, 
discovery would be more realistically defined as embracing all available instruments of 
fact ascertainment. Thus, in a criminal case, such things as the identity of witnesses, 
statements made at preliminary hearings, and scientific data collected by police labo-
ratories would be proper subjects for discovery. See Louisell, Criminal Discovery: 
Dilemma Real or Apparent?, 49 CALIF. L. R.Ev. 56, 61 (1961). 
4 See, e.g., King v. Holland, 4 T.R. 691, 100 Eng. Rep. 1248 (K.B. 1792). It would 
appear that the common-law judges were unable to conceive of the granting of discovery 
in a criminal case, and deemed it unnecessary to give a principled justification for denial 
of requests for discovery by the defendant, other than saying that there was no precedent 
for so doing. 
5 E.g., United States v. Garsson, 291 Fed. 646 (S.D.N.Y. 1923). In the course of his 
opinion Judge Learned Hand said: "Under our criminal procedure the accused has every 
advantage. While the prosecution is held rigidly to the charge, he need not disclose the 
barest outline of his defense. He is immune from question or comment on his silence; 
he cannot be convicted when there is the least fair doubt in the minds of any one of 
the twelve. Why in addition he should in advance have the whole evidence against him 
to pick over at his leisure and make his defense fairly or foully, I have never been able 
to see." Id. at 649. But see Goldstein, The State and the Accused: The Balance of 
Advantage in Criminal Procedure, 69 YALE L.J. 1149, 1152 (1960). 
il E.g., State v. Tune, 13 N.J. 203, 210, 98 A.2d 881, 884 (1953). The argument that dis-
covery leads to the facilitation of perjury appears to be, at best, questionable. The 
defendant who actually committed the crime charged will remain silent or rely on 
perjured testimony in any case. The argument also presupposes that the criminal sanc-
tions against false testimony and tampering with witnesses are ineffective. The potential 
threat of perjury was also raised when discovery was introduced into civil trials, yet, 
despite these fears, civil litigation does not seem to have suffered from this innovation. 
See generally Speck, The Use of Discovery in United States District Courts, 60 YALE L.J. 
1132, 1154 (1951); Sunderland, Scope and Method of Discovery Before Trial, 42 YALE L.J. 
863, 867 (1933). 
7 State v. Rhodes, 81 Ohio St. 397, 424, 91 N.E. 186, 192 (1910). With the e.xception 
of two states which provide for it by statute, there is a constitutional privilege against 
self-incrimination in all states. See 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2252 (McNaughten rev. 1961). 
8 See, e.g., State ex rel. Mahoney v. Superior Court, 78 Ariz. 74, 275 P.2d 887 (1954); 
State v. Haas, 188 Md. 63, 51 A.2d 647 (1947); Commonwealth v. Galvin, 323 Mass. 205, 
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On the other hand, the decisions preceding that of the court in the principal 
case, have, with a single exception,9 denied the prosecution's request for 
discovery in the absence of appropriate statutory authorization. Such stat-
utes as exist are almost entirely limited to situations where the defendant 
intends to rely on an alibi or insanity as a defense. The alibi statutes, which 
have been adopted in fourteen states,10 typically preclude the defendant 
from raising an alibi defense in the absence of notice to the prosecution 
of his intention to do so within a specified time prior to the trial, accom-
panied by specific information regarding his whereabouts at the time of 
the commission of the alleged offense. The eleven states having insanity 
defense statutes11 similarly require advance notice and often provide as 
well for the disclosure of those witnesses upon whose testimony the defend-
ant intends to rely. Only one statute goes so far as to require each of the 
parties to a criminal action to provide his adversary with a list of witnesses 
who will be called to trial regardless of the character of the defense.12 
80 N.E.2d 825 (1948); People v. Johnson, 356 Mich. 619, 97 N.W.2d 739 (1959); Hameyer 
v. State, 148 Neb. 798, 29 N.W.2d 458 (1947); State v. Wise, 19 N.J. 59, 115 A.2d 62 
(1955);, People v. Brown, 272 App. Div. 972, 71 N.Y.S.2d 594 (1947); State v. Lacie, 118 
Utah 128, 221 P.2d 852 (1950); State v. Payne, 25 Wash. 2d 407, 171 P.2d 227 (1946). 
But see Walker v. People, 126 Colo. 135, 248 P.2d 287 (1952), holding that discovery 
should not be allowed in criminal cases in the absence of legislation. There is also a 
limited discovery right for the defendant in the federal courts. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16, 
17(c). Under Rule 16, the evidence must be tangible objects, material to the defense, 
which were obtained from the defendant by seizure or process. It is usually held that 
the defendant may not discover his own statements under Rule 16, though defendants 
have fared better in this regard under Rule 17(c). See Schaffer v. United States, 221 F.2d 
17 (5th Cir. 1955); Shores v. United States, 174 F.2d 838 (8th Cir. 194:9). Discovery of 
third party statements have been denied under the rules, however. See generally Kaufman, 
Criminal Discovery and Inspection of Defendant's Own Statements in Federal Courts, 
57 CoLU!II. L. REv. 1113 (1957); Orfield, Discovery and Inspection in Federal Criminal 
Procedure, 59 W. VA. L. REv. 221 (1957). 
o McCain v. Superior Court, 184 Cal. App. 2d 813, 7 Cal. Rptr. 841 (1960), afj'd sub 
nom. People v. McCain, 200 Cal. App. 2d 825, 18 Cal. Rptr. 912 (1962). The California 
District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's granting of reciprocal motions for 
discovery in a criminal case. However, the affirmance was based on the fact that the 
defendant had made no objection to the prosecution's discovery prior to the granting of 
the motion, and therefore had waived the privilege. The court refused to deal with the 
question of whether the granting of discovery would be a violation of the privilege 
in the absence of waiver. 
10 IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 9-1631 to -1933 (1956); IowA CODE § 777.18 (1958); KAN. GEN. STAT. 
ANN. § 62-1341 (1949); MICH. COMP. LAws §§ 768.20-.21 (1948); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 630.14 
(1947); N.J. RuLES 3:5•9 (1953); N.Y. CoDE CRIM. PRoc. § 295-1; Omo REv. CoDE ANN. 
§ 2945.58 (Page 1954); OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 585 (1951); S.D. CoDE § 34.2801 (1939); UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 77-22-17 (1953); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 6561-62 (1958); WIS. STAT. § 955.07 
(1959); ARiz. R. CRIM. P. 192B. 
11 ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-1301 (1947); CAL. PEN. CoDE § 1016; CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN. 
§ 39-8-1 (1953); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 909.17 (1944); IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-1701 (1956); IowA 
CoDE § 777.18 (1962); MICH. CO?,IP. LAws §§ 768.20-.21 (1948); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-22-16 
(1953); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 6561-62 (1959); WASH. REv. CODE § 10.37.030 (1951); AR!z. 
R. CRIM. P. 192A. 
12 WASH. REv. CoDE § 10.37.030 (1951). However, this statute is of questionable value, 
as the trial court may allow additional witnesses so long as the other side has sufficient 
time to interview them. If necessary, a continuance will be granted. See State v. Hoggatt, 
38 Wash. 2d 932, 234 P.2d 495 (1951). 
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The decision of the Supreme Court of California in the principal case 
extends the availability of discovery procedures to the prosecution despite 
the absence of statutory authorization.13 This extension constitutes a natural 
development of the principles which initially led the same court to grant 
discovery to the defendant.14 The decision to permit the defendant to 
utilize discovery procedures resulted in part from the court's recognition 
that the primary purpose of a criminal trial is the ascertainment of facts, 
coupled with a willingness on the part of the court to adopt procedures 
thought to be conducive to the full and accurate presentation of competent 
evidence relevant to the factual issues in controversy, while, at the same 
time, assuring the defendant of a fair hearing. In compelling the disclosure 
of relevant information in the possession of the prosecution, the court ob-
served that, with the exception of those instances in which effective law 
enforcement might necessitate secrecy, the state had no interest in securing 
the conviction of an accused because of the defense's inability either to 
cross-examine the prosecution's witnesses effectively, or to anticipate the 
nature of the prosecution's case so as to prepare material rebuttal evidence.15 
Thus, in order to obtain a conviction, the prosecution was forced to rely 
upon the persuasiveness of its evidence rather than upon the tactical ad-
vantages which might have been gained from concealment and surprise. 
Because of the importance of providing the defendant with an effective 
means of fact ascertainment, the court was willing to risk the possibility 
that information procured through discovery techniques might be utilized 
to fabricate a defense out of perjured testimony. The court, by its decision 
in the principal case, recognized that these principles have correlative ap-
plicability to the discovery of evidence in the defendant's possession. In-
sofar as the privilege against self-incrimination and other privileges con-
13 The only statute dealing with any type of discovery in California requires the 
defendant to plead insanity or double jeopardy specially. CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 1016-17, 
1026. The California legislature rejected an alibi statute [Assembly Bill 484 (1961)], with 
the opposition to the bill based on the fear that the government might intimidate wit-
nesses. See generally Waddington, Criminal Discovery and the Alibi Defense, 37 L.A.B. 
BULL. 7, 26 (1961). 
14 In California, the defendant has been permitted to use discovery to obtain access 
to transcripts, notes and recordings of his conversations with the police; police records; 
written confessions; written statements made by the prosecution's witnesses; and samples 
taken from the victim's body, together with autopsy reports. For a summary of the 
California decisions, see People v. Norman, 177 Cal. App. 2d 59, 1 Cal. Rptr. 699 (1960). 
The granting of criminal discovery to the defendant, while still theoretically in the 
discretion of the trial court in California, is given virtually as a matter of course. See 
generally Louisell, supra note 3, at 82. But cf. People v. Cooper, 53 Cal. 2d 755, 349 P.2d 
964, 3 Cal. Rptr. 148 (1960), in which the trial court's denial of the defendant's blanket 
request for all written statements in the possession of the prosecution was upheld on 
the ground that the defendant must have a better reason for requesting discovery than 
a mere desire to benefit from the entirety of the information assembled by the prosecu-
tion. See also People v. Norman, supra, upholding the denial by the trial court of the 
defendant's discovery motion made after an adverse verdict on the ground that the 
defendant had waived his privilege of discovery. See also cases collected in Louisell, 
supra note 3, at 81 n.117. 
15 See People v. Riser, 47 Cal. 2d 566, 586, 305 P.2d l, 13 (1956). 
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£erred by law are inapplicable, the defendant is held to have no legitimate 
interest in denying the prosecution access to information in his possession 
which might, if disclosed, illuminate the factual issues in controversy and 
thereby facilitate their accurate, orderly, and complete resolution.16 In 
order to avoid a possible conflict with the defendant's privilege against 
self-incrimination, and because the facts of the case necessitated nothing 
more, the court allowed discovery of only that information which pertains 
to evidence which the defendant intends to produce at trial.17 
The major difficulty presented by this decision lies in determining the 
extent to which the privilege against self-incrimination limits the avail-
ability of discovery to the prosecution. The California Supreme Court has 
all but final authority to define the scope of protection afforded by the 
privilege, since it is conferred by the state constitution.18 The dissent in 
the principal case would construe the privilege as conferring an absolute 
right on the defendant to withhold disclosure of any information in his 
possession until such time as he might deem disclosure necessary or desir-
able.19 Such a construction would give the privilege an unnecessarily 
double effect. It would not only afford the defendant a safeguard against 
the compulsory disclosure of incriminating evidence, but would also pro-
vide him with a tactical device that would enable him to withhold the 
disclosure of non-incriminatory evidence which he intends to introduce 
at the trial until the element of surprise and the unpreparedness of the 
prosecution could be fully exploited.20 The majority, on the other hand, 
while conceding the propriety of according the defendant protection against 
the compulsory disclosure of incriminating evidence, would deny the use of 
the privilege as a tactical device which would enable the defendant to 
employ the element of surprise at the trial. Because the information per-
taining to the evidence which the defendant actually intends to produce 
at trial is hardly likely to be of an incriminatory nature, such information 
was held not to be protected from discovery by the privilege. Thus, the 
decision goes no further than to require disclosure of certain evidence at 
a point in time earlier than was theretofore necessary.21 Consequently, the 
16 Principal case at 920, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 880. 
17 Id. at 922, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 882. 
18 CAL. CONST. art I, § 13. The states have great leeway in defining the scope of 
their own privilege against self-incrimination. Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117, 125 (1961). 
The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution has no application to state 
criminal proceedings. See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947); Twining v. New 
Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908). 
10 Principal case at 923, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 883. 
20 The element of surprise in criminal trials is the bane of prosecutors. It is the 
problem of the surprise witness who appears at or near the close of the trial to give 
testimony, often perjured, favorable to the defense, and thus creating a "reasonable 
doubt" as to defendant's guilt, that the alibi statutes have attempted to rectify. See 
statutes cited in note IO supra. 
21 This argument has been used to uphold the alibi statutes against the challenge 
based on the privilege against self-incrimination. See State v. Smetana, 131 Ohio St. 329, 
2 N.E.2d 778 (1936); People v. Shulenberg, 279 App. Div. 115, 112 N.Y.S.2d 374 (Sup. Ct. 
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majority's decision would appear to preserve the integrity of the privilege 
as a safeguard while, at the same time, facilitating the full and accurate 
presentation of evidence relevant to the resolution of the factual issues in 
controversy. In addition, the decision tends to rectify the procedural im-
balance created by the court's earlier decisions granting only the requests 
made for discovery by the defendant.22 
Although the majority is silent on the point, the dissent in the principal 
case suggests that the majority's holding limits the availability of discovery 
procedures to the prosecution to those instances in which the defendant 
intends to raise affirmative defenses.23 Such a limitation would be un-
fortunate, as it would frustrate the development of any system whereby 
discovery procedures would be independently available to both parties in 
a criminal trial.24 While the availability of discovery to the prosecution can-
not be unlimited, any limitations placed upon it should be based on the 
existence of the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination or any 
other privileges conferred by law, rather than upon an attempt to categorize 
certain information as discoverable because it relates to the character of 
the defense. Rather, the rule should more appropriately be that the de-
fendant must give notice of any and all defenses he intends to raise at 
trial and allow the prosecution discovery of information pertaining to such 
1952); State v. Kopacka, 261 Wis. 70, 51 N.W.2d 495 (1952). See also State v. Osburn, 
171 Kan. 330, 232 P.2d 451 (1951); People v. Longaria, 333 Mich. 696, 53 N.W.2d 685 
(1952); State v. Payne, 104 Ohio App. 410, 149 N.E.2d 583 (1957), each upholding the 
trial court's refusal to admit alibi testimony after the defendant had failed to comply 
with the statute. See generally Dean, Advance Specifications of Defense in Criminal Cases, 
20 A.B.A.J. 435 (1934). 
22 An alternative solution to this problem, possibly more palatable to other courts, 
would be to adopt the practice whereby trial courts in their discretion would withhold 
discovery from any defendant unwilling to grant a reciprocal privilege to the prosecution. 
See Goldstein, supra note 5, at 1198. The trial courts may condition their grant of 
discovery to the defendant in any way they see fit, as discovery is not required by due 
process in a criminal trial. Cicenia v. LaGay, 357 U.S. 504, 510-11 (1958). Since the 
defendant's voluntary acquiescence would operate as a waiver of his privilege against 
self-incrimination, conflict on that point would be avoided. Cf. McCain v. Superior 
Court, 184 Cal. App. 2d 813, 7 Cal. Rptr. 841 (1960), afj'd sub nom. People v. McCain, 
200 Cal. App. 2d 825, 18 Cal. Rptr. 912 (1962); 8 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 7, § 2275. 
No procedural. advantages would be enjoyed by either party, because discovery would 
be granted, if at all, only on a reciprocal basis. However, in those instances where the 
defendant would not choose to request discovery, the court's policy of facilitating fact 
ascertainment through pre-trial disclosure of information pertinent to the resolution 
of factual issues would be frustrated. 
23 Principal case at 925, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 885. The dissent points out that there is 
great controversy over what actually constitutes an affirmative defense. It would therefore 
be unsatisfactory to allow the availability of discovery to the prosecution to be controlled 
by the existence or non-existence of an affirmative defense in the case. See also ILL. CRIM. 
CODE § 3-2 (1961); MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.13 & comment, at 108 (Tent. Draft. No. 4, 
1955). 
24 A system of independent discovery is to be distinguished from one of reciprocal 
discovery. The former permits either side to avail itself of discovery procedures upon 
its own motion. Reciprocal discovery allows discovery to the prosecution only if the 
defendant first requests it for himself. See note 22 supra. 
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defenses. ~n order to insure compliance with this rule, the defendant should 
be precluded from raising any defenses of which he failed to give notice.25 
Two limitations to this rule should be recognized. First, the defendant 
should be allowed to defeat the discovery motion by the prosecution by 
invoking the privilege against self-incrimination, if he first satisfies the 
court that the information which the prosecution seeks to discover, though 
pertinent to his defense, would tend to incriminate him. The prosecution 
should also be prevented from discovering such items as memoranda, plans 
for presentation, notes of interviews with witnesses, and other items which 
go to make up the file of the defendant's counsel.26 The purpose of the 
latter limitation is to prevent the prosecution from using the fruits of the 
defense counsel's research and analysis in preparing his case. It would be 
questionable policy to relieve the prosecution of the duty of ascertaining 
for itself the relevance of various statutes and previous judicial decisions 
to the cases it brings to trial. Such a rule as that proposed, coupled with 
the widespread availability of discovery to the defendant in many states, 
would further the interest of society as a whole in having facts ascertained 
in all criminal trials. , 
The modem law of criminal procedure reflects the interest of society 
in protecting the individual from the power of the state. The many safe-
guards afforded the defendant are thought to reduce the possibility that 
an innocent man will be sent to his death or to prison through involvement 
with the judicial process. However, vindication of the innocent, although 
certainly one legitimate objective of the criminal law, must be balanced 
against the equally important objective of punishing the guilty. Over-
emphasis on the first-named objective could result in a situation whereby 
the verdict in a criminal trial will depend not so much on the justice of 
the defendant's cause as on the skill of his counsel in employing the tactical 
devices placed in his possession by contemporary procedures. These proce-
dures are the product of a system of law which was based on the traditional 
concept that litigious conflict was conducive to the ascertainment of truth. 
Discovery has been resisted by those who fear that the introduction of 
discovery procedures would undermine the adversary system. Resistance 
on this ground is unwarranted, as the availability of such procedures would 
enhance the ability of counsel to contest the factual issues in controversy 
since they would be better acquainted with the information pertaining 
25 The defendant should be allowed to raise any defense which comes to light during 
the trial of which he was unaware before trial, even though he has failed to give notice 
of it for that reason. In such cases, a two or three-day continuance could be granted in 
order that the prosecution may discover information pertaining to the new defense. 
Presumably such a continuance would not encroach on the defendant's right to a speedy 
trial. 
26 Such a limitation is imposed upon discovery procedures in civil litigation, and is 
based on the attorney-client privilege. The law is not settled as to exactly what items 
should remain non-discoverable under this rule. See generally McCORMICK, EVIDENCE 
§ 100 (1954). 
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to those issues. In addition, discovery procedures would serve to eradicate 
the devices of surprise and concealment which are probably the most un-
desirable by-products of the adversary system. 
Thomas G. Dignan, ]1'. 
